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Although prosocial behaviors have been widely studied across disciplines, the
mechanisms underlying them are not fully understood. Evidence from psychology,
biology and economics suggests that prosocial behaviors can be driven by a variety of
seemingly opposing factors: altruism or egoism, intuition or deliberation, inborn instincts
or learned dispositions, and utility derived from actions or their outcomes. Here we
propose a framework inspired by research on reinforcement learning and decision
making that links these processes and explains characteristics of prosocial behaviors in
different contexts. More specifically, we suggest that prosocial behaviors inherit features
of up to three decision-making systems employed to choose between self- and other-
regarding acts: a goal-directed system that selects actions based on their predicted
consequences, a habitual system that selects actions based on their reinforcement
history, and a Pavlovian system that emits reflexive responses based on evolutionarily
prescribed priors. This framework, initially described in the field of cognitive neuroscience
and machine learning, provides insight into the potential neural circuits and computations
shaping prosocial behaviors. Furthermore, it identifies specific conditions in which each
of these three systems should dominate and promote other- or self- regarding behavior.
Keywords: model-based, model-free, Pavlovian, reinforcement learning, dictator game, prosocial behavior,
altruism, warm-glow
The existence of prosocial behaviors—actions that increase the welfare of others, often at cost to
oneself—remains an enduring scientific puzzle. At a first glance such behaviors are inconsistent
with the axiom of rational self-interest in neo-classical economics, the law of natural selection
in evolutionary biology and the law of effect in behavioral psychology. Nevertheless, prosocial
behaviors are widespread across cultures and also found in the animal kingdom (Waal, 1997;
Henrich et al., 2001; Engel, 2011). One persisting set of questions concerns the extent to which such
behaviors are guided by an ‘‘altruistic’’ motivation to improve the welfare of others. For decades,
scientists have debated whether altruistic motivation even exists, and if so, whether it is ‘‘rational’’
in the sense of satisfying real preferences, or rather is a by-product of our evolutionary history.
We suggest that to answer both of these questions it is necessary to examine different motivations,
and the prosocial behaviors they give rise to, in terms of their underlying cognitive and neural
mechanisms.
Here we will show that many theories about the causes of prosocial behaviors can be organized
and integrated under a reinforcement learning and decision-making (RLDM) framework, initially
developed in the field of cognitive neuroscience and machine learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, 2008; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). We will argue that this scheme not only
streamlines the seemingly heterogeneous landscape of motivations driving prosocial behaviors, but
also provides insight into the mechanisms governing them. In a broader context, this proposition
also complements recent suggestions that an RLDM framework can help explain patterns of
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moral judgments (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013) and
elucidate computations underlying social cognition (Dunne and
O’Doherty, 2013).
As prosocial behaviors can be expressed in many ways and
describing them all is beyond the scope of this paper, we
will focus here on sharing, consoling, helping and cooperating.
To tackle the problem more formally, we will attempt, where
possible, to use examples from game theory—most notably
the Dictator Game, in which a participant receives a certain
endowment and must decide whether to transfer some portion
of it to another participant (Forsythe et al., 1994). We will start
our considerations with a brief outline of the RLDM framework
and its underlying computations. Subsequently, we will consider
how three decision systems described by it, either in isolation or
through interacting with one another, can give rise to different
characteristics of prosocial behavior.
The RLDM Framework
The RLDM framework addresses the problem of how artificial
agents should make choices and learn from interactions with
the environment to achieve some goal (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
It was built on the Markov decision processes framework,
according to which every decision-making problem can be
decomposed into four elements: the agent’s situation (state),
which defines currently available outcomes; the agent’s choices
(actions), which define currently available behaviors; the agent’s
goal (reward function), which defines how rewarding given
outcomes are, and finally the model of the environment
(transition function), which defines how given choices lead to
certain situations (Sutton and Barto, 1998; van Otterlo and
Wiering, 2012). This formalization has been used in three classes
of algorithms aiming to optimize decision-making: model-based
planning, which infers the best decisions from knowledge of the
environment;model-free learning, which learns the best decisions
from the outcomes of past actions; and a priori programming,
which defines the best decisions for each situation beforehand,
for example on the basis of performed simulations (Sutton and
Barto, 1998; van Otterlo and Wiering, 2012).
Reinforcement learning algorithms, in principle, can be
employed in any domain, and each of them, given enough
information, can prescribe an optimal policy for a wide range of
problems. One could speculate that such universal tools would
be advantageous for any organism struggling for survival and
therefore their emergence should be promoted by evolution.
Indeed, a large body of evidence suggests that similar algorithms
are present in the mammalian brain and are embedded in the
goal-directed, habitual, and Pavlovian decision-making systems
(Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Balleine and
O’Doherty, 2010; Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
All three RLDM systems learn about some part of the
stimulus-response-outcome contingency, and use this
knowledge to make decisions (Figure 1; Table 1). The
goal-directed system uses response-outcome associations to
infer which responses will bring the best outcomes from the
perspective of current goals. It can be characterized as deliberate,
dominating at the beginning of learning, dependent on working
FIGURE 1 | Stimulus-Response-Outcome contingency and
corresponding decision-making systems. The Stimulus-Response-
Outcome association is learned through mechanisms of instrumental
conditioning, and the Stimulus-Outcome association through mechanisms of
classical conditioning. The goal-directed system uses response-outcome
associations to infer which actions will bring the best outcomes from the
perspective of current goals. The habitual system uses stimulus-response
associations to emit responses that produced the best outcomes in similar
situations in the past. The Pavlovian system emits innate responses to
outcomes that were significant in our evolutionary history or stimuli that were
associated with these outcomes.
memory and sensitive to sudden changes in motivational states.
The habitual system uses stimulus-response associations to emit
responses that produced the best outcomes in similar situations
in the past. It dominates in later stages of learning, is independent
from working memory and insensitive to sudden changes in
motivational states. These two systems are called ‘instrumental’
as they use associations learned through actions. In contrast,
the Pavlovian system emits reflexive responses to outcomes
that were significant in our evolutionary history or stimuli that
were associated with these outcomes through the mechanisms
of classical conditioning. For example, pavlovian system can
emit approach reaction to stimuli associated with food and
withdrawal reaction to stimuli associated with pain. Importantly,
these responses might be highly sophisticated and sensitive to
contextual cues, as in the case of a flight reaction to distal threat
and a fight reaction to proximal threat (McNaughton and Corr,
2004). Pavlovian responses, unlike those of the instrumental
systems, are inborn, inflexible and preprogrammed by evolution.
As such, this system is unable to update its responses when they
produce undesirable outcomes. Instead, Pavlovian responses
are beholden to the evolutionary context in which they evolved.
As a result, Pavlovian responses are efficient solutions to a
range of situations that were important in our phylogeny, but
may sometimes produce counterproductive behaviors when the
current environment demands a more tailored response.
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TABLE 1 | Properties of three decision-making systems.
Goal-directed system Habitual system Pavlovian system
• Employs model-based planning algorithms • Employs model-free learning algorithms • Employs a priori programmed solutions
• Deliberate • Automatic/Learned • Automatic/Inborn
• Dominating at the beginning of learning • Dominating in late stages of learning • Can dominate at all stages of learning
• Dependent on working-memory • Independent from working-memory • Independent from working-memory
• Sensitive to sudden changes in motivational states • Insensitive to sudden changes in motivational states • Sensitive to sudden changes in motivational states
• Sensitive to consequences of actions • Insensitive to consequences of actions • Insensitive to consequences of actions
The RLDM framework shares many similarities with dual-
process accounts of judgment and decision making, in which
one system is usually described as emotional, intuitive, domain-
specific and automatic, and a second system as cognitive,
reflective, domain-general and controlled (Stanovich and West,
1998; Evans, 2008). However, neither of these systems can be
directly mapped to the RLDM framework because of a few
important differences. First of all, the RLDM systems do not
distinguish between ‘‘emotion’’ and ‘‘cognition’’; rather, all of the
RLDM systems rely on emotions, in the sense of processing the
affective valence of events. Furthermore, the RLDM systems use
well-specified algorithms that do not have an equivalent in dual-
process frameworks. Finally, the RLDM framework emphasizes a
distinction between inferred, learned and inborn responses—one
that is often overlooked by other frameworks. Therefore, it can
be concluded that, despite some overlap, the RLDM framework
is distinct from traditional dual-process accounts in psychology.
In the following sections, we will describe the computational
properties and neural substrates of the goal-directed, habitual
and Pavlovian systems, as well as procedures used to differentiate
between them.
The Goal-Directed System
Model-based planning algorithms select the best decision on the
basis of available information—extracted, for instance, from task
instructions (Daw, 2012). The tree-search algorithm is one of
the main examples of this approach. It utilizes a model of the
environment to simulate the outcomes of each possible sequence
of actions and then evaluates the cumulative value of them in
the light of current goals (Daw et al., 2005; Daw, 2012). By
considering each possible scenario, this approach ensuresmaking
an optimal decision. However, it has some limitations. The first
problem is that the agent might not have enough information
about the environment to foresee the consequences of each
action. Computer scientists deal with this issue by adding a
component to the above algorithm that infers the unknown
contingencies (Littman, unpublished doctoral dissertation). The
second problem is intractability—the more potential sequences
of actions and the more complex relationships between them,
the more probable it is that the agent will not have enough time
and computational power to evaluate all possible outcomes. To
prevent this, model-based algorithms use heuristics to narrow
down the extent of considered scenarios (Daw, 2012). Other
approaches propose that model-based planning, rather than
investigating the consequences of each action, could also start
with the desirable end state and try to infer, for example through
a procedure known as Bayesian model inversion, the actions that
could lead to this state (Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012; Solway
and Botvinick, 2012).
Employing tree-search and Bayesian model inversion
algorithms to behavioral tasks shows that these algorithms
share many characteristics of the goal-directed system, including
sensitivity to changing circumstances and having an advantage at
the beginning of learning over other RLDM systems (Daw et al.,
2005; Keramati et al., 2011; Solway and Botvinick, 2012). Perhaps
the most surprising common feature of model-based algorithms
and the goal-directed system is the slow pace of operation.
Serial processing of standard computer processors greatly limits
how many sequences of actions can be evaluated in a unit of
time. In the brain, which mostly relies on parallel processing
(Alexander and Crutcher, 1990), this problem should be much
less pronounced. However, taxing participants’ working memory
with a demanding task impairs functioning of the goal-directed
system (Otto et al., 2013), and suggests that, at least in part, the
goal-directed system also employs serial processing (Zylberberg
et al., 2011).
Although many brain regions underlie the goal-directed
system, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) stands out
as one of its main neural substrates. First, fMRI studies show
that the DLPFC is engaged in tasks involving cognitive processes
related to model-based computations, such as: forward planning
(Kaller et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012), organizing working
memory content (Owen et al., 2005) and updating a model
of the environment (Gläscher et al., 2010). Second, single-
unit recordings in monkeys’ DLPFC show that neurons in this
region encode all variables crucial for performing tree-search
and Bayesian model inversion algorithms—namely the potential
outcomes, actions and goals (Abe and Lee, 2011; Genovesio
et al., 2014). Third, modeling of DLPFC activity suggests that
it shows some characteristics of serial processing (Yildiz and
Beste, 2014). Finally, disrupting DLPFC function using TMS
impairs participants’ performance in tasks requiring model-
based computations (Smittenaar et al., 2013).
The orbitofrontal cortex and anterior caudate nucleus
have also been identified as important components of
the goal-directed system (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010;
Gläscher et al., 2010). However, recent evidence suggests
that these regions might integrate information from all three
decision-making systems (Daw et al., 2011; Liljeholm and
O’Doherty, 2012; Wunderlich et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014).
For these reasons in further sections we will concentrate on
DLPFC and treat its activation as being consistent with an
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involvement of the goal-directed system, although we note
this assumption should be treated with caution as it represents
reverse inference—i.e., the logical fallacy of inferring the
involvement of a particular cognitive function from brain
region activation, when this region is not engaged exclusively
by this cognitive function (Poldrack, 2006; but see: Hutzler,
2014).
The Habitual System
Model-free learning algorithms ignore the model of the
environment and instead integrate the history of consequences of
a given action into a cached action value (Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Dayan, 2008). Although there are many different procedures
describing this process, here we will focus on the family of
actor-critic models that have been inspired by neuroscience (Joel
et al., 2002). In essence, in these models the actor automatically
choses the action with the highest expected value. The critic,
in turn, evaluates the outcomes of this action and ‘‘teaches’’
the actor how to update the expected value—by adding to
the previous expectation a fraction of a prediction error (the
difference between the actual and expected value). As this
algorithm relies on a single cached value, refined incrementally,
it is much more computationally efficient than its model-based
alternative.
Efficiency of the model-free algorithms comes at a cost: as
model-free algorithms require extensive experience to optimize
their policies, they are outcompeted by model-based algorithms
when rapid changes in the environment invalidate what has been
learned so far (Carmel and Markovitch, 1998). This property
is related to the insensitivity of the habitual system to sudden
changes in motivational states and the gradual transition from
goal-directed to habitual control with experience. Both of these
features are well illustrated by the example of the devaluation
procedure (Gottfried et al., 2003). In this procedure rats are
first trained to make an action (such as pressing a lever) to
obtain a rewarding outcome, e.g., sweetened water. At some
point, the value of water is artificially diminished (i.e., devalued)
by pairing it with nausea-inducing chemicals, which makes
the previously desired outcome aversive. If the devaluation
procedure is carried out early in training, when the habit of
pressing the lever is still weak, rats will not perform the action
that delivers the now-devalued sweetened water in this situation.
But if the devaluation procedure is employed after extensive
training, rats will keep pressing the lever in this situation, even
though they are no longer interested in the outcome of this
action.
Neuroscientific evidence in general supports the actor-
critic model as a plausible computational approximation of
the habitual system, although details of how it is actually
implemented in the brain are still under debate (Dayan and
Balleine, 2002; Joel et al., 2002). First, the division between
the actor and the critic is mimicked by the dissociation
between the action-related dorsal and reward-related ventral
parts of the striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2004; FitzGerald et al.,
2012). Furthermore, responses of neurons in both of these
regions resemble prediction errors (Schultz, 1998; Joel et al.,
2002; Stalnaker et al., 2012). Finally, parallel processing in
the striatum (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Yildiz and Beste,
2014), its dense connections with sensorimotor cortex (Ashby
et al., 2010) and increasing involvement of its dorsal part
with training (Tricomi et al., 2009) explains the fast responses
of the habitual system, in comparison to its goal-directed
counterpart.
The Pavlovian System
Instead of letting an algorithm infer or learn the best policy,
one can simply program a priori the best action for any given
situation and execute it automatically whenever this situation
is encountered (van Otterlo and Wiering, 2012). This could be
done either on the basis of the programmer’s knowledge or
algorithmically, for example using the Monte Carlo method,
which identifies the best responses by simulating random
action sequences in a given environment and averages the
value of outcomes for each response in a given situation
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). The main shortcomings of this
strategy are its specificity and inflexibility. As the variety
of situations in the real world is potentially infinite, it is
unfeasible to pre-program appropriate responses to all of them,
and therefore one has to focus on some subset of events.
One solution to this problem is to generalize rules defining
when the given action should be executed. However, such
generalizations increase the risk of encountering exceptions to
the rule, where the triggered action is inappropriate in the given
context.
The Pavlovian system bears many similarities to this strategy,
as it reflexively executes unconditional approach and withdrawal
responses to classes of stimuli that were important in our
evolutionary history. Characteristics of cues triggering these
unconditional responses were probably determined by relative
costs of omissions vs. false alarms in our phylogeny (Schmajuk,
1987; Parker and Smith, 1990). For example, it might have been
more adaptive to overgeneralize features triggering reactions to
potential threats, as in the case of a startle response induced by
suddenness, because omissions could result in death, whereas
false alarms merely cost energy. Classical conditioning can be
thought of as a mechanism that helps the organism to generalize
inborn Pavlovian responses to situations not consistently
paired with unconditional stimuli in our evolutionary history,
but nevertheless predicting their occurrence in the current
environment.
Inflexibility of Pavlovian responses can have maladaptive
consequences in certain contexts—classically illustrated in the
negative auto-maintenance procedure (Williams and Williams,
1969). In the first phase of this procedure, food is reliably paired
with a conditioned stimulus, until the animal starts to approach
not only the food, but also the conditioned stimulus. In the
second phase, food is delivered only if the animal refrains from
approaching the conditioned stimulus. Although in this context
approach behaviors bring negative consequences, animals will
repeat them for thousands of trials without obtaining any
reward (Killeen, 2003). This procedure not only demonstrates
the rigidity of the Pavlovian system, but also its strength
when it is pitted against the two other systems (Dayan et al.,
2006).
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The Pavlovian system has many similarities with the habitual
system, and in many cases their influences might be hard to
distinguish, as both systems involve responses that are automatic,
independent of working memory and insensitive to the predicted
consequences of actions (Table 1). To prove that a response
has a Pavlovian rather than a habitual character one has
to show that it is inborn, instead of learned. Furthermore,
Pavlovian responses are sensitive to the current motivational
state of the organism, in contrast to habitual responses (Dayan
and Berridge, 2014). Specifically, conditioned stimuli associated
with a particular outcome will trigger automatic approach
reactions only if the animal is currently in a state in which
the associated outcome is rewarding. For example, rats are
typically attracted to a lever associated with sucrose solution
delivery and repulsed by a lever associated with a highly saline
solution delivery (Robinson and Berridge, 2013). However,
rats that are injected with a drug mimicking the state of
salt deprivation start to express Pavlovian approach responses
towards the lever previously associated with saline solution, such
as sniffing, grasping and nibbling. These reactions occur even
though approaching the lever does not deliver any outcome
and therefore has no instrumental value or even has a negative
action value because it was previously associated with an aversive
outcome.
Importantly, the Pavlovian system can invigorate or inhibit
the responses of the instrumental systems—a phenomon known
as Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT; Talmi et al., 2008;
Lewis et al., 2013). Specifically, the presence of appetitive
stimuli has been shown in many experiments to invigorate
instrumental approach reactions and inhibit instrumental
withdrawal reactions (Talmi et al., 2008; Corbit and Balleine,
2011; Huys et al., 2011; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014). For example,
Huys et al. (2011) have shown that visual cues previously
associated with monetary rewards speeded movement towards
the target stimulus, and slowed movement away from the
target stimulus. In contrast, visual cues previously associated
with monetary losses have been shown to inhibit instrumental
approach reactions and invigorate instrumental withdrawal
reactions (Huys et al., 2011; Lewis et al., 2013). The precise
mechanisms underlying PIT are still not well understood.
It has been proposed that PIT could modulate instrumental
approach and withdrawal reactions either through increasing
the expectation of a specific outcome or increasing positive and
negative arousal (Corbit and Balleine, 2005, 2011).
At the neural level, the most important substrates of the
Pavlovian system are the amygdala, which is crucial for acquiring
associations between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli
(Savage and Ramos, 2009), and the ventral striatum, which
takes part in processing the value of primary rewards and
punishments, as well as the value of conditioned stimuli
(Liljeholm and O’Doherty, 2012). Both of these structures
also play a crucial role in PIT (Corbit and Balleine, 2005,
2011; Talmi et al., 2008; Lewis et al., 2013). At the level of
neurotransmitters, Pavlovian approach reactions have been
predominantly associated with dopamine and Pavlovian
inhibition with serotonin (Boureau and Dayan, 2011; Crockett
et al., 2012; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014).
An RLDM Framework for Prosocial
Behavior
Having characterized the three RLDM systems in more detail,
it is important to ask why the RLDM framework is suitable
for describing and explaining prosocial behaviors. It could be
argued that choice between other- and self-regarding acts is
just an ordinary decision-making problem for the brain, and
therefore it should be resolved by general-purpose decision-
making systems. In this scenario, processes underlying prosocial
behaviors would face the same challenges as any other decision
and in consequence inherit the exact characteristics of whichever
system is primarily responsible for them.
An alternative perspective suggests that, due to the
importance of social interactions for human survival, selective
pressures could have produced dedicated brain circuits
responsible for other-regarding acts, such that they could be
motivated by unique processes extending beyond reinforcement
learning mechanisms (Field, 2004). We do not exclude this
possibility; however we argue that a strong separation between
decision-making systems and circuits responsible for prosocial
behaviors is unlikely in light of the substantial overlap between
social and economic decisions on the neural and behavioral
level (Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Following the debate about common
currency in neuroeconomics—according to which the brain
makes choices using a single scale that represents the values of
options irrespective of the social or non-social nature of stimuli
(Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Ruff and Fehr, 2014)—we suggest
instead that brain circuits specialized for prosocial behaviors,
if such circuits exist, could either be embedded within the
general-purpose RLDM systems or constitute an input and
output for them.
In the following sections, we will review evidence showing
that many instances of other-regarding acts resemble goal-
directed, habitual or Pavlovian decisions. Furthermore, we
will suggest in what contexts each of these systems should
promote or suppress prosocial behaviors from the perspective
of reinforcement learning. Future work will need to address to
what extent this framework is sufficient to explain the broad array
of observed patterns of prosocial behavior and to what extent it
needs to be supplemented by other mechanisms.
Goal-Directed Prosocial Behavior
A desire to achieve some goal, through the means of other-
regarding acts, is perhaps the most straightforward motivation
driving prosocial behaviors. Evolutionary biologists and neo-
classical economists proposed that the superordinate goal of
all behaviors is to propagate one’s own genes and maximize
one’s own utility, respectively (Hamilton, 1964; Hollander,
1977). Consequently, according to these perspectives, all other-
regarding acts are ultimately selfish. Alternative accounts
proposed that some people might have genuine preferences
for others’ welfare or act in accordance with moral principles
(Batson, 1994; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). In this section we
will review how self-interest can motivate prosocial behavior
and show that to appreciate the benefits of other-regarding acts,
people must simulate the short- and long-term consequences
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of their behavior on the basis of knowledge about the
environment—an ability constituting a hallmark of the goal-
directed system, requiring model-based computations and likely
implemented by the DLPFC. Furthermore, we will suggest that
the samemechanisms are employed in the pursuit of non-egoistic
goals.
The first mechanism through which self-interest can motivate
prosocial behavior is direct reciprocity, where helping someone
increases the likelihood that they will return the favor (Trivers,
1971). Direct reciprocity has been mostly studied using the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in which two players have to
decide whether to cooperate or defect (Rapoport, 1965). If both
cooperate, each gets a moderate reward; if both defect, each gets
only a small reward. If one defects while the other cooperates, the
defector gets a large reward while the cooperator gets nothing.
If the game is played only once, from the perspective of
an individual it is always better to defect, because this either
exploits the other’s cooperativeness or avoids exploitation of the
individual. If the game is repeated, however, in the long run
mutual cooperation maximizes the outcomes of both players.
Therefore, each player has to establish when cooperative moves
have a chance of being reciprocated and adjust their strategy
accordingly. The most successful strategies (‘‘tit-for-tat’’) always
start with cooperative move and copy responses of the opponent
from the previous encounter thereafter (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981). Furthermore optimal strategy should be also sensitive to
the probability of future interactions and switch from the above
‘‘tit for tat’’ behavior to ‘‘always defect’’ when this probability is
low (Rand and Nowak, 2013).
Direct reciprocity is common in humans but surprisingly
rare in other animals (Clutton-Brock, 2009). One reason for this
might be that it requires sophisticated cognitive abilities absent in
simpler organisms (Stevens and Hauser, 2004). A well-developed
goal-directed system might be one such ability. In the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma an agent has to resolve a conflict between
smaller rewards now, resulting from defection, and cumulatively
larger rewards later, resulting from long-term cooperation—a
task reportedly hard for animals (Green et al., 1995). The goal-
directed system has the capacity to promote optimal strategies
for the current situation as it is able to evaluate the cumulative
value of outcomes of different action sequences and override
automatic responses. Therefore it can choose a tit-for-tat strategy
when the probability of future interactions is high, but switch to
defection when it is low—a pattern often observed in behavioral
experiments (Bó, 2005; Rand and Nowak, 2013). Consistent with
the involvement of the goal-directed system in direct reciprocity,
holding a belief that one’s interaction partner will reciprocate in
an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, relative to lacking insight into the
partner’s strategy, is associated with greater activity in theDLPFC
(Sakaiya et al., 2013). The same brain region was shown to be
engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma by prosocial individuals when
they decided to defect, as well as in antisocial individuals when
they decided to cooperate, suggesting that it might be involved in
goal-directed adjustments of dominant behaviors (Rilling et al.,
2007).
Another mechanism through which self-interest could
motivate prosocial behavior is indirect reciprocity—that is,
gaining personal benefits from having a good reputation (Nowak
and Sigmund, 2005). Laboratory experiments show that being
publicly generous pays back, as third parties tend to reward
those who are kind to others (Wedekind and Braithwaite,
2002; Servátka, 2010). Behaving in line with social norms
also improves one’s public image (Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009; Bereczkei et al., 2010) and being altruistic increases
one’s sexual attractiveness (Farrelly et al., 2007; Barclay, 2010).
Perhaps the strongest evidence that people are in fact driven
by such motivations comes from the studies that eliminate the
opportunity to improve one’s reputation by making all prosocial
acts anonymous, which greatly decreases the willingness to share
an endowment (Bereczkei et al., 2010; Franzen and Pointner,
2012; but see: Barmettler et al., 2012). Importantly, prosocial
behaviors are performed more vigorously in public only if they
signal to the audience intrinsic prosocial motivations; this vigor is
diminished if the person could appear to be acting prosocially to
obtain external rewards (Ariely et al., 2009). Differential prosocial
behavior between public and private conditions can already be
observed in 5-year-olds (Engelmann et al., 2012; Leimgruber
et al., 2012). Moreover, this effect is sensitive to the features
of the observer: 5-year-olds share more resources when the
person looking can potentially reward them for good deeds,
in comparison to the situation when they cannot, suggesting
that this behavior is, at least in part, deliberate and strategic
(Engelmann et al., 2013). Such reputation management probably
depends on the development of theory of mind, understood
as an ability to attribute mental states to others, as it enables
individuals to judge how their actions will be evaluated by others.
Consistent with this, chimpanzees and children with autism, both
characterized by an underdeveloped theory of mind, do not seem
to be concerned about their own reputation (Izuma et al., 2011;
Engelmann et al., 2012). On the other hand, studies investigating
influence of individual differences in theory of mind on prosocial
behaviors found mixed results (Edele et al., 2013; Artinger et al.,
2014).
How are concerns about one’s reputation incorporated into
prosocial decisions? We speculate that the goal-directed system
treats others’ minds as a part of the environment and simulates
their contents in order to determine the consequences of one’s
actions for one’s own reputation. In line with this idea, some
studies suggest that in economic games the engagement of
theory of mind is related to activity in the DLPFC, among
other areas (Yoshida et al., 2010), and involves computations
similar to tree-search (Yoshida et al., 2008) and Bayesian model
inversion algorithms (Baker et al., 2009; Moutoussis et al., 2014).
Consistently, disruption of DLPFC by TMS impairs the accuracy
of theory of mind (Costa et al., 2008) and diminishes concerns
about one’s reputation (Knoch et al., 2009).
Avoiding punishments for violating social norms is another
factor motivating people to behave prosocially. This problem
has been studied using the ultimatum game, in which a proposer
decides how to divide a sum of money (e.g., $10) between
themselves and another participant, similarly to the dictator
game (Güth et al., 1982). However, unlike in the dictator
game, the recipient can reject the offer and then both of the
participants get nothing. Recipients often reject offers perceived
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 135
Ge¸siarz and Crockett Goal-directed, habitual and Pavlovian prosocial behavior
to be unfair—a behavior interpreted as costly punishment of a
fairness norm violation (Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Henrich et al.,
2006) or, in the case of some individuals, as spite (Brañas-Garza
et al., 2014). Perhaps anticipating this, proposers usually share
money to a higher degree than in the standard dictator game.
On the other hand, reducing the negative consequences of offer
rejection for the proposer proportionally decreases their offers
(Handgraaf et al., 2008). Together these findings suggest that
there is a strategic component to proposers’ prosocial behavior.
Children playing the role of proposer in the ultimatum game
dramatically increase their offers as soon as they are able to
pass the false-belief task, indicating the development of a theory
of mind (Sally and Hill, 2006; Castelli et al., 2010; Takagishi
et al., 2010). However, it is not clear if this developmental
milestone increases a preference for fairness or the ability to
strategically adjust fair behavior to benefit oneself. To extract
the purely strategic component of prosocial behavior, researchers
have compared offers in the dictator game and the ultimatum
game made by the same individual. The difference in offers
between these two games rises substantially from early to
middle childhood (Sally and Hill, 2006) and is associated with
maturation of the DLPFC (Steinbeis et al., 2012), suggesting
involvement of the goal-directed system. Consistent with this,
prosocial behavior in the ultimatum game, relative to the
dictator game, is associated with stronger activation in the right
DLPFC, lateral OFC and caudate nucleus (Spitzer et al., 2007).
Furthermore, stimulation of the right DLPFC by tDCS not only
increases donations in the ultimatum game, but also decreases
donations in the dictator game (Ruff et al., 2013), suggesting that
the right DLPFC plays a causal role in calculations aiming to
maximize personal benefits.
If the norm of fairness was the only factor regulating how
much people share in ultimatum games, people should never give
more than half of their initial endowment. In reality, however,
some subjects do (Chang et al., 2011), which implies the existence
of additional motives. It can be argued that compliance with
others’ expectations, rather than compliance with cultural norms,
might be a more sensitive strategy for building a good reputation
and avoiding punishments. Consistent with this, in a study by
Chang et al. (2011) participants playing the ultimatum game tried
to make offers meeting the expectations of the other person,
rather than splitting the endowment evenly. Moreover, this
behavior was related to activation in the DLPFC, among other
regions.
So far we have reviewed studies suggesting that prosocial
actions are motivated at least in part by strategic self-interest and
likely fall within the purview of a goal-directed RLDM system.
Nevertheless, there is also evidence that even in the absence of
personal incentives to behave prosocially, some people are still
willing to help others (Batson et al., 1999; Franzen and Pointner,
2012). As the goal-directed system enables the pursuit of any goal,
one potential explanation for these selfless behaviors is that some
people are simply motivated to act in accordance with moral
principles.
Several different types of moral values inform human social
behavior and there is an ongoing debate about which ones
can be considered universal (Haidt, 2007). In the context of
sharing, three values seem to be particularly important: equality,
meritocracy and effectiveness (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fong,
2007; Konow, 2010). People seem to incorporate these values
into decisions to share resources, giving more money to the
less fortunate, those who deserve it and those for whom the
transfers are more effective, respectively (Brañas-Garza, 2006;
Dawes et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2008; Almås et al., 2010). Moreover,
some people reject offers favoring themselves over the other
person (Blake and McAuliffe, 2011), are more willing to donate
money to charities than to students (Konow, 2010) and are
willing to pay money to ensure the implementation of the most
effective charity option (Null, 2011). Although these studies
do not exclude an involvement of egoistic motivations, they
clearly show that people are concerned about the consequences
of their actions for other people from the perspective of moral
principles.
Habitual Prosocial Behavior
Previous work combining the RLDM framework with game
theory has demonstrated that simple model-free algorithms,
which gradually increase the probability of successful actions
and decrease the probability of unsuccessful actions, better
describe human behavior than a priori programmed optimal
strategies in a variety of two-player non-cooperative economic
games (Erev and Roth, 1998; Sarin and Vahid, 2001). However,
without making any additional assumptions, these same model-
free algorithms predict a decrease in cooperation over time in
a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in sharp contrast to observed
human behavior, which is characterized by an increasing
tendency to cooperate over time (Erev and Roth, 2001).
Computer simulations suggest that model-free algorithms are
able to learn to cooperate in a variety of cooperative games under
the assumption that outcomes of cooperation are satisfactory
for both partners of interaction, and are guaranteed to do so
if in addition cooperation is more satisfactory than actions
maximizing one’s own payoffs at the cost of the other player
(Sarin, 1999; Macy and Flache, 2002). What mechanism could
ensure that cooperation is satisfactory for both players and
more satisfactory than the maximizing option? Social norms of
reciprocity and fairness, creating additional utility from acting
according to these norms, could be one possibility (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). Alternatively, but not exclusively, the goal-
directed system could interact with the habitual system and
reinforce prosocial actions which fulfill some goals, for example
actions that boost one’s reputation or are in line with some
moral values. Consistently, such actions are often found to be
associated with increased activity in ventral and dorsal striatum
(Hsu et al., 2008; Izuma et al., 2010; Tricomi et al., 2010).
According to the RLDM framework, frequent rewarding of a
given action should lead to a gradual transition from goal-
directed to habitual control of that action (Daw et al., 2005).
Consequently, with extensive experience, certain actions can
become automated and valued in and of themselves, irrespective
of their consequences. In the following, we will show that
many reported observations of prosocial behaviors suggest that
these behaviors have features of habits and intrinsically valued
actions.
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The notion of prosocial habits is similar to the social heuristics
hypothesis, according to which other-regarding acts in one-
shot anonymous games stem from intuitive processes, shaped
by successful strategies in social interactions and internalization
of cultural norms (Rand et al., 2014). In line with both
accounts, playing a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, in which the
payoff structure promoted cooperation, was shown to increase
other-regarding behavior in a subsequent battery of one-shot
economic games, in comparison to a condition where the
payoff structure promoted defection (Peysakhovich and Rand,
2013). It is important to note, however, that interpreting this
result as evidence for habit acquisition requires making a
few assumptions, as in the classic RLDM literature habits are
usually tied to a specific situation and action, rather than a
general behavioral tendency expressed across different contexts.
Although the generalization of actions across situations has been
observed in the case of motor habits (Krakauer et al., 2006;
Hilario et al., 2012), it is very limited in scope. Therefore, future
studies need to clarify if prosocial habits can spill over into novel
situations and generalize to similar actions to a much greater
extent than motor plans, or if these findings can be explained by
other phenomena.
The possibility that some prosocial actions might be habitual
and chosen without regard for their consequences fits many
findings in behavioral economics. According to public goods
theory, if rational individuals were interested in achieving some
desirable state of the social environment, then government
spending on that cause should diminish their willingness to
financially support it, an assumption known as the ‘‘crowding
out’’ hypothesis (Steinberg, 1991; Andreoni, 1993). Indeed, some
experiments demonstrated this effect by forcefully taking money
from a participant’s endowment and, in a transparent manner,
transferring it to a given cause (Eckel et al., 2005). However,
other experimental and field studies, using slightly different
procedures, found incomplete crowding out (Andreoni, 1993;
Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). Similarly, satisfying the norm of
fairness in a dictator games by providing an equal endowment
to the dictator and the recipient does not completely diminish
dictators’ willingness to share the endowment (Konow, 2010;
Korenok et al., 2013). Furthermore, although people are eager to
donate money to charities, most are unwilling to spent money
to learn which actions support charities efficiently (Null, 2011).
These studies suggest that the aid itself is not the main purpose
of these acts.
In line with this, some people are willing to donate money
to charity even if they know that their actions are completely
ineffective. For example, Crumpler and Grossman (2008)
introduced a variation of the dictator game in which any action
of the dictator was counterbalanced by the experimenter, such
that a donation of $10 to charity would result in the experimenter
donating nothing, whereas a donation of $0 would result in the
experimenter donating $10. Nevertheless, subjects still gave away
about 20% of their endowment in this situation, although there
was no reason to do so if they were solely motivated by concern
about the welfare of the charity. This effect was still present, albeit
smaller, when researchers controlled for the concern about the
welfare of the experimenter (Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2014). It is
unlikely that the above findings were driven by the expectations
of the experimenter as the procedure was double-blind and
also because other studies examining dictator giving, performed
without the presence of the experimenter, have reported similar
proportions of giving (Barmettler et al., 2012).
The above results have been explained in the terms of a ‘‘warm
glow’’—i.e., utility derived from the act of giving itself, regardless
of its outcomes (Andreoni, 1990, 1993). Support for a quite
literal interpretation of the warm glow hypothesis comes from
the studies showing that giving money away to others produces
positive feelings (Konow, 2010; Aknin et al., 2013). Although
both 7-year-olds and 9-year-olds share their resources in a fair
way, only the latter group feels better after doing this—suggesting
that warm glow might require some experience to develop
(Kogut, 2012). However, there is also some evidence for warm
glow in children as young as two years (Aknin et al., 2012). Before
this age children have already begun to engage in spontaneous
helping behavior (Brownell and Carriger, 1990; Zahn-Waxler
et al., 1992; Warneken and Tomasello, 2007; Liszkowski et al.,
2008; Brownell et al., 2009; Bischof-Köhler, 2012) and are able to
use model-free representations to guide behavior (Klossek et al.,
2008), so it is plausible that warm glow effects could rely on the
habitual system, but their developmental trajectory remains to be
established. Results from experiments investigating warm glow
bear striking similarity to those usually seen in the devaluation
procedure—that is, persistence in performing an action because
of its intrinsic value, despite diminished value of its outcome.
Therefore one can speculate that they both in fact describe the
same process. Consistently, on the neural level both habitual
actions and warm glow-giving engage the ventral and dorsal
striatum (Harbaugh et al., 2007).
Another feature shared by habits and some forms of prosocial
behavior is automaticity, characterized by effortlessness and
rapidness. One of most popular procedures used to study
automaticity is working memory load, which is thought to
impair the functioning of the goal-directed system and increase
reliance on the habitual system (Otto et al., 2013). Schulz et al.
(2014) used this manipulation in a series of mini-dictator games,
in which participants had to make binary choices between
arbitrarily defined equal and unequal divisions of money. They
found that working memory load increased the proportion
of fair choices. Importantly, this increase was present for all
decisions, irrespective of the level of unfairness of the alternative,
in sharp contrast to the control condition, where participants’
decisions were highly dependent on the degree of advantageous
inequity—an effect that mirrors the insensitivity of the habitual
system to the consequences of one’s actions. Consistently, other
studies have found that working memory load also decreased
the strategic tendency to defect near the end of the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma, reflecting blindness of the habitual system
to future (Duffy and Smith, 2014).
Conceptualizing some prosocial behaviors as habitual actions
can also potentially explain variation in prosocial behavior.
Individual differences in prosocial orientation might stem
to some extent from varying levels of the automatization
of other-regarding acts, emerging due to different personal
experiences. In support for this claim, working memory load
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enhances prosocial behavior only for individuals with a prosocial
orientation measured by questionnaires, but has an opposite
effect on individuals with a proself orientation (Cornelissen et al.,
2011)—consistent with the notion that prosocial behaviors of the
first group might be more habitual and the second group more
goal-directed. Studies using an ego-depletion procedure found
similar results for proself oriented individuals, and slightly less
consistent results for prosocial individuals (Balliet and Joireman,
2010; Halali et al., 2013).
Complementing these findings, some studies have shown
that prosocial decisions are faster (Rand et al., 2012; Lotito
et al., 2013; Rand et al., 2013) and are increased under time
pressure, especially for subjects who do not have experience with
anonymous one-shot economic games promoting self-interested
acts (Cappelletti et al., 2011; Rand et al., 2012, 2014). However,
it is important to note that some studies failed to replicate
these results (Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester,
2014), and prosocial decisions concerning harm to others are
slower than selfish decisions (Crockett et al., 2014).
We have shown many parallels between habits and prosocial
acts on the behavioral level. Do habits and prosocial acts also
engage similar neurocomputational mechanisms? Support for
the applicability of the critic component of the actor-critic
model in the context of prosocial behaviors comes from studies
showing that outcomes of social interactions in economic games
(Rilling et al., 2004; Zhu et al., 2012), violations of social norms
(Klucharev et al., 2009; Xiang et al., 2013), signs of social approval
(Jones et al., 2011) and even consequences of transferring money
to charity (Kuss et al., 2013) are encoded in the form of
reward prediction errors in the ventral striatum, in line with
the possibility that this signal is used to update the expected
value of other-regarding acts. Much less is known about the
dorsal striatum and its role as an actor in this context, although
some studies indeed found that activity of this brain part can be
predictive of some other-regarding acts (Rilling et al., 2004; de
Quervain et al., 2004; King-Casas et al., 2005; Harbaugh et al.,
2007).
Separate lines of research focused on the influence of
intuition, warm glow and habitual control in promoting
prosocial behavior seem to converge in showing that other-
regarding acts can be reinforced by experience, automated and
have an intrinsic value. Future work will need to assess to
what extent these disparate findings are actually characterizing
the same process, vs. unique phenomena—an endeavor that
can be facilitated by well-defined computational and neural
characteristics of the habitual system. An important caveat is
that automaticity and independence of responses from working
memory are also features of the Pavlovian system, and therefore
many of the above findings could be also attributed to Pavlovian
control. To resolve this issue, future experiments will need to
carefully control for current motivational states and experience
with the given type of social interactions, as the habitual system
should be insensitive to the former but sensitive to the latter.
In the next section, we will discuss the potential contribution
of a reflexive Pavlovian system that both complements and
competes with the goal-directed and habitual systems for control
of prosocial behavior.
Pavlovian Prosocial Behavior
Recent advances in developmental psychology have shown that
infants are probably closer to Rousseau’s noble savages than
Locke’s moral blank slates, as they are armed from birth with
mechanisms allowing them to evaluate moral acts and favor,
in many cases, good over evil (Bloom, 2013). However, beyond
judging other’s behavior, are infants also predisposed to behave
prosocially? In this section we will review evidence suggesting
that some other-regarding acts might be inborn and triggered by
evolutionary oldmechanisms embedded in the Pavlovian system.
First we consider the possibility that some prosocial
tendencies expressed early in development might have a flavor of
innate Pavlovian reflexes. There is ample evidence showing that
children around the age of 15 months start to engage in sharing,
cooperating and consoling (Brownell and Carriger, 1990; Zahn-
Waxler et al., 1992; Warneken and Tomasello, 2007; Brownell
et al., 2009; Bischof-Köhler, 2012). Helping can be observed
even earlier, at the age of 12 months (Liszkowski et al., 2008).
These behaviors could be driven by a goal-directed system and a
desire to increase others’ welfare. However, children before the
age of 24 months do not seem to choose actions based on the
predicted value of their outcomes (Klossek et al., 2008; Kenward
et al., 2009), suggesting they are unlikely to engage in prosocial
behaviors due to valuing their consequences. Alternatively, early
social experiences and interactions with parents could reinforce
prosocial behaviors and promote formation of prosocial habits.
However, parental encouragement does not increase helping
(Warneken and Tomasello, 2013) and external rewards can even
hinder it in 20-month-old infants (Warneken and Tomasello,
2008). The last possibility is that prosocial behaviors are driven by
some inborn factors. In line with this, researchers have observed
similar developmental patterns of sharing and cooperating in
early childhood across different cultures (House et al., 2013), as
well as examples of helping and consolation in different species,
including apes (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006; Romero et al.,
2010), rats (Bartal et al., 2011) and birds (Seed et al., 2007).
What innate mechanism could potentially drive prosocial
behaviors? Affective empathy constitutes a likely candidate (de
Waal, 2008; Bischof-Köhler, 2012). It develops on the basis
of emotional contagion—i.e., the automatic matching between
one’s own emotional state and the state of the perceived other
(Preston and de Waal, 2002). Notably, emotional contagion is
present from birth and also found in other mammals (Dondi
et al., 1999; Langford et al., 2006; Nakashima et al., 2015). When
children develop a self-other distinction around the age of 15
months, they also start to be aware that shared feelings originate
from the state of the other person and are able to volitionally
attend to it or not—an ability that constitutes an essence of
affective empathy (Preston and de Waal, 2002; Bischof-Köhler,
2012). From the age of 18 months children are also able to
infer the emotional states of others not only from emotional
expressions but also from situational contexts (Vaish et al., 2009),
implying that from early on we possess sophisticated capabilities
of affective perspective taking.
Affective empathy has been associated with other-regarding
acts in many studies. First, the occurrence of various prosocial
behaviors correlates with the development of a self-other
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distinction and, in consequence, with the development of
affective empathy in children (Brownell and Carriger, 1990;
Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Bischof-Köhler, 2012). Second, self-
reported measures of affective empathy correlate with various
prosocial behaviors in adults (Eisenberg andMiller, 1987). Third,
observing another’s suffering is a potent motivator of other-
regarding acts: rats pull levers to terminate the distress of
other rats (Bartal et al., 2011), monkeys refuse to pull a lever
delivering food if it also delivers electric shocks to another
monkey (Masserman et al., 1964), and humans are willing to
swap places with a suffering person receiving shocks (Batson
et al., 1987). Finally, impairment of affective empathy may play
a causal role in antisocial behavior in psychopathy (Blair, 2005;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).
Why would affective empathy promote prosocial behaviors?
Feeling empathy towards a suffering individual is a source of
a negative arousal and therefore other-regarding acts could be
potentially driven by an instrumental motivation to eliminate
it—either by bringing relief to someone or escaping from the
source of distress (Cialdini et al., 1987). Consequently, habitual
system should reinforce the action that lead to removal of
aversive stimulus. However, humans exposed to other’s suffering
are more willing to help, even when they can avoid the
whole situation in an easy and costless way—which suggests
that, at least in case of humans, empathy might trigger an
approach rather than a withdrawal reaction (Batson et al., 1987;
Stocks et al., 2009). This approach reaction is consistent with
the empathy-altruism hypothesis, according to which feeling
empathic concern for someone in need can evoke a genuine
preference for the other’s well-being—a claim which has received
solid support throughout the years (Batson et al., 1987; Batson,
2011). Importantly, dependence of this reaction on the state
of empathic concern is inconsistent with the involvement of
habitual system, as this system is insensitive to motivational
states.
We speculate that the mechanism described by the empathy-
altruism hypothesis has a Pavlovian character. More specifically,
we propose that cues signaling harm or need, such as sad faces,
may trigger an automatic urge to help, but only if a person is in
the appropriate motivational state, that is, feels empathic concern
for the other person. In line with this, 10 month old infants do
not withdraw from victims of aggression, but instead show a
preference for them, in comparison to both neutral objects and
aggressors—an effect that might be interpreted as a rudimentary
and perhaps inborn form of concern about the other’s well-being
(Kanakogi et al., 2013).
Further support for the notion of a Pavlovian urge to
help triggered by empathic concern comes from experiments
demonstrating that inducing empathic concern can eclipse other
goals and lead to maladaptive behaviors—just as in the case of
the negative auto-maintenance procedure. For example, people
make unfair decisions in favor of a person for whom they
feel empathy, even when some other person is in greater
need (Batson et al., 1995a); they unconditionally cooperate
with an empathized target in the prisoner’s dilemma, even
when the target has already defected (Batson and Moran, 1999;
Batson and Ahmad, 2001); and they allocate more money to
an empathized target, even at the cost of lower payouts for
the whole group and damaging their own reputation (Batson
et al., 1995b, 1999). Moreover, empathy induction in one
context does not increase willingness to help the empathized
target in other contexts—excluding the possibility that this
procedure leads to generalized concern about other’s well-being
(Dovidio et al., 1990). These examples demonstrate a Pavlovian-
like inflexibility and specificity of the empathy-induced other-
regarding reaction.
If this reaction is indeed Pavlovian, what could be
its evolutionary origin? One proposition is that empathic
concern stems from an over-generalization of the parental care
instinct (Preston and de Waal, 2002; de Waal, 2008; Batson,
2010). Caretaking in mammals has a very strong reflexive
component—as illustrated by a study in which both male and
female virgin rats, with paralyzed voluntary muscle control,
showed nursing behavior when exposed to unfamiliar pups
(Stern, 1991). Furthermore, many animals have been observed
to adopt unrelated orphans, suggesting that in some cases
childlike features might be sufficient to evoke a parental care
reflex and altruistic behaviors (Boesch et al., 2010). In line
with this, it has been found that people are more likely to
help and care for others possessing childlike facial and vocal
characteristics, irrespective whether they are children or adults
(Keating et al., 2003; Lishner et al., 2008; Glocker et al., 2009). It is
possible that, due to some environmental pressures, a Pavlovian
system evolved in humans to trigger caretaking reactions to
a wider range of stimuli than only to infants. What makes
this claim plausible is that humans show signs of alloparenting
and cooperative breeding—that is, taking care of children that
are not their own and are often genetically unrelated (Burkart
et al., 2014). Crucially, cooperative breeding requires increased
responsiveness and an attentional bias towards signals of need.
These requirements may have predisposed us to feel empathic
concern in a broad array of situations (Burkart and van Schaik,
2010). Consistently, across 15 species of primates, the extent
of engagement in cooperative breeding is one of the best
predictors of other-regarding preferences in social interactions
with strangers (Burkart et al., 2014).
In addition to guiding prosocial behaviors directly through
inborn reflexes, the Pavlovian system may modulate habitual or
goal-directed other-regarding tendencies through Pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer (PIT). We assume that prosocial behaviors
have an approach character, and as such can be invigorated by
presence of appetitive cues and inhibited by aversive cues. Some
preliminary evidence in support of this claim comes from studies
measuring reaction times of prosocial decisions. In general, it
has been found that other-regarding acts are faster than self-
regarding acts in the context of rewards—an effect that was
interpreted as evidence for the automaticity of such responses
(Rand et al., 2012, 2013; Lotito et al., 2013). However, a recent
study has shown that altruistic individuals make slower decisions
when they decide for others in the context of punishments
(Crockett et al., 2014), suggesting that the difference in reaction
times between rewarding and punishing contexts might stem
from Pavlovian invigoration and inhibition of instrumental
approach reactions.
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Aside from modulating the vigor of responding, could PIT
also increase the tendency to act prosocially? We suggest that
indeed prosocial dispositions could be enhanced by a range of
Pavlovian cues triggering approach reactions towards people,
either through evoking positive arousal or increasing expectation
of positive outcomes—effects which could be also interpreted
as changes in mood and inferences about outcomes of social
interaction. Happy expressions and direct eye-gaze could be
examples of such Pavlovian cues: two-day-old newborns look
longer at happy faces, in comparison to fearful and neutral ones
(Farroni et al., 2007), and also at faces making direct eye-contact
with them, in comparison to the ones with averted gaze (Farroni
et al., 2002). These same cues also increase prosocial behaviors
later in life: smiling faces increase helping and cooperating in
one-shot social interactions (Scharlemann et al., 2001; Guéguen
and De Gail, 2003; Reed et al., 2012; Mussel et al., 2013);
and pictures of eyes increase prosocial behaviors in anonymous
dictator games and charitable donations in field experiments
(Haley and Fessler, 2005; Rigdon et al., 2009; Powell et al., 2012;
but see: Fehr and Schneider, 2010). As most of these studies
focused on happy expressions and compared them to neutral
expressions, future work will need to address the question if also
other signs of experiencing emotions can work as Pavlovian cues.
Cues of familiarity and similarity might also enhance
prosocial tendencies through PIT, as they also trigger reflexive
approach reactions: newborns and infants prefer familiar faces
(Barrile et al., 1999; Kelly et al., 2005) and 10 month olds
prefer individuals with similar tastes to themselves (Mahajan
and Wynn, 2012; Hamlin et al., 2013). Attraction towards
familiar and similar others probably evolved as a heuristic for
identifying and favoring kin—a highly beneficial ability from
the perspective of spreading copies of one’s genes (Hamilton,
1964; Lieberman et al., 2007). However, these cues also enhance
prosocial behaviors inmany other situations. For example, seeing
a picture or knowing a surname of the recipient in the dictator
game increases willingness to share the endowment (Bohnet and
Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2008); and
membership in the same group (Ahmed, 2007; Halevy et al.,
2012) or having similar facial features with another person
(DeBruine, 2002; Krupp et al., 2008) promotes other-regarding
acts in various economic games.
It could be argued, that aggression and urge to punish
somebody are an approach reactions and therefore, according to
the above account, should also be enhanced by appetitive cues.
However, aggression and punishment can have a dual character:
either prosocial, as in the case of punishments in the ultimatum
game for violating social norms, or antisocial, as in the case of
spite. We speculate that prosocial or antisocial nature of these
actions provides a higher order context for the Pavlovian system.
Consequently, we predict that appetitive cues will invigorate
prosocial punishment and will inhibit antisocial punishment. As
none of the studies so far has directly tested this hypothesis,
future work will need to fill in this gap.
Other findings can also be re-interpreted through the lens of
classical conditioning and PIT effects. Earlier we discussed the
study by Peysakhovich and Rand (2013), in which repeated play
of a prisoner’s dilemma in settings promoting defection increased
a general tendency to act in a self-interested manner in other
economic games. Involvement of the habitual system in the above
findings might be questionable in light of the low generalizability
of habits across contexts in other experiments using non-
social stimuli (Krakauer et al., 2006; Hilario et al., 2012). An
alternative explanation proposes that participants associated
defecting anonymous players with a negative feeling through
classical conditioning. This negative association could then stain
subsequent interactions with other anonymous players in other
games through PIT. To test this directly, future work will need
to measure physiological reactions to anonymous players, while
participants gradually acquire negative association. Supporting
this idea, cooperation and defection in the prisoner’s dilemma
has been shown to increase and decrease, respectively, the
likeability of other player’s faces, as well as modulate amygdala
responses to these faces in subsequent task (Singer et al., 2004).
In this section we have shown that many theories about the
causes of prosocial behaviors can be re-interpreted in terms
of Pavlovian reflexes and the mechanism of PIT. According to
this view, the Pavlovian system can compete with other RLDM
systems for behavioral control and trigger automatic prosocial
behaviors in response to perceiving signals of need and feeling
empathic concern for others. Alternatively, the Pavlovian system
could interact with other RLDM systems by enhancing the
likelihood and vigor of prosocial acts in the presence of stimuli
evoking approach reactions towards other people.
Discussion
In this review we summarized evidence showing how the
RLDM framework can integrate diverse findings describing
what motivates prosocial behaviors. We suggested that the goal-
directed system, given sufficient time and cognitive resources,
weighs the costs of prosocial behaviors against their benefits,
and chooses the action that best serves one’s goals, whether
they be to merely maintain a good reputation or to genuinely
enhance the welfare of another. We also suggested that to
appreciate some of the benefits of other-regarding acts, such as
the possibility of reciprocity, agents must have a well-developed
theory of mind and an ability to foresee the cumulative value
of future actions—both of which seem to involve model-based
computations.
Furthermore, we reviewed findings demonstrating that the
habitual system encodes the consequences of social interactions
in the form of prediction errors and uses these signals to
update the expected value of actions. Repetition of prosocial
acts, resulting in positive outcomes, gradually increases their
expected value and can lead to the formation of prosocial habits,
which are performed without regard to their consequences. We
speculated that the expected value of actions on a subjective
level might be experienced as a ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1990),
linking our proposition to the behavioral economics literature.
We also suggested that the notion of prosocial habits shares
many features of the social heuristics hypothesis (Rand et al.,
2014), implying that the habitual system could be a possible
neurocognitive mechanism explaining the expression of social
heuristics.
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Finally, we have posited that the Pavlovian system, in response
to another’s distress cues, evokes an automatic approach
response towards stimuli enhancing another’s well-being—even
if that response brings negative consequences. We have also
proposed that presence of appetitive and aversive stimuli can
increase or decrease the vigor of prosocial reactions through the
mechanism of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer. Pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer could also be responsible for the enhancing
effects of familiarity, similarity, happy expressions and pictures
of eyes on prosocial acts.
In addition to organizing a diverse set of findings on
patterns of prosocial behavior, the RLDM framework also
provides insight into possible sources of individual differences,
developmental changes and interspecies variability in prosocial
tendencies. Furthermore, by connecting behavioral economics,
psychology, cognitive neuroscience, evolutionary biology and
machine learning, this scheme opens new avenues of research at
the boundaries of these disciplines.
However, explaining prosocial behavior within the RLDM
framework is far from complete. There is an ongoing debate
concerning the basic neural circuitry of the goal-directed,
habitual and Pavlovian system, and researchers have only
recently begun to uncover how these systems cooperate and
compete with one another (Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Lee et al.,
2014). Meanwhile, there is still relatively little work elucidating
the neural substrates of prosocial behaviors, and almost none
of this research has attempted to explain prosocial behaviors
explicitly in terms of RLDM mechanisms. Future work will
need to especially focus on the instances of prosocial behaviors
which could be under the control of more than one system and
utilize paradigms used in classical RLDM literature to disentangle
influence of each of the three systems.
Here we mainly focused on the role of the DLPFC and
striatum in motivating prosocial behaviors—the former being
a crucial hub of model-based computations used for goal-
directed behavior, and the latter responsible for the formation
of habits and approach reactions towards stimuli. It is important
to note that many of the studies cited in this review also
reported the involvement of other neural circuits associated with
the RLDM framework, such as the orbitofrontal cortex and
the amygdala. However, their precise functional role in other-
regarding decisions is less clear than the role of the DLPFC and
striatum. Furthermore, it is known that brain regions involved
in affective processing and social cognition, such as the anterior
insula, anterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex and
temporo-parietal junction, also play a vital role in prosocial
behaviors—although traditionally they are not considered to
be a part of the RLDM neural circuitry (Singer et al., 2006;
Hare et al., 2010; Morishima et al., 2012; Waytz et al., 2012;
Smith et al., 2014). Following other authors, we suggest that
information encoded by these regions serves as an input for the
three decision-making systems used to predict the consequences
of one’s actions in social situations and compute the values of
different states of the world (Phelps et al., 2014; Ruff and Fehr,
2014).
Under the assumption that the three decision-making systems
described here indeed govern prosocial behaviors, it is possible
to generate a number of specific predictions that have yet
to be tested. First, according to the RLDM framework, the
goal-directed system might use heuristics to narrow down
the range of considered scenarios, such as discarding action
sequences which produce immediate and substantial negative
outcomes—a process described as Pavlovian ‘pruning’ (Huys
et al., 2012). Such a process could be responsible for selfish
decisions in situations involving immediate personal costs,
despite much greater potential social benefits. Therefore it is
speculated that costly prosocial behaviors could be enhanced
by situating the personal costs later in the action sequence.
Second, irrelevant cues evoking approach and withdrawal
reactions towards another person could potentially invigorate
or inhibit prosocial tendencies towards this person, through
the mechanism of PIT (Bray et al., 2008)—a feature that could
be used, for example, in fund-raising advertisements. Third,
the formation of habits requires in the training phase that
the learner experience an instrumental contingency between
responses and outcomes; in other words, the learner has to
feel that given actions are associated with some positive value
(Keramati et al., 2011). Actions that simultaneously bring
counterbalanced appetitive and aversive consequences will have
a net value close to zero and therefore will be immune to
habitization. From this one could predict that costless other-
regarding acts will be particularly prone to becoming habits,
while prosocial behaviors requiring difficult trade-offs will
probably stay under the control of the goal-directed system.
Finally, it is well established in the RLDM literature that
random schedules of reinforcements, that is reinforcements
delivered at unpredictable intervals, lead to rapid habit formation
(Derusso et al., 2010). Therefore one could speculate that
uncertainty embedded in social interactions is particularly well-
suited to automatize prosocial behaviors, as other-regarding
acts are not always and not immediately rewarded. Knowledge
of which conditions are the most effective in creating habits
could potentially be used in designing interventions to promote
prosocial tendencies.
We began this review by referring to a question about the true
motivation behind prosocial behaviors. Perhaps not surprisingly,
dissecting the mechanisms shaping other-regarding acts reveals
a blend of altruistic and egoistic motives at their source.
What is important, however, is that reinforcement learning
mechanisms are able to transform egoistic motivations into
prosocial behaviors, as in the case of prosocial habits formed on
the basis of repetition of egoistically motivated other-regarding
acts, and altruistic motivations into antisocial behaviors, as in the
case of empathic concern for one person eclipsing the well-being
of people in greater need. These insights, among others described
here, demonstrate the potential for this line of research to help
improve society.
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